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appeals, arguing,
fundamental error by imposing duplicitous sentences in Docket Number 42759 in
violation of the Idaho Constitution's protections against double jeopardy.

During oral

argument, the Court questioned whether Idaho's pleading test is still valid in light of the
fact that I.C. § 18-301 has been repealed. Ultimately, while appellate counsel noted a
desire to double check the Idaho Constitution's double jeopardy provisions before
definitively answering some of the Court's questions, counsel recognized that, if Idaho's
pleading test died with I.C. § 18-301, the double jeopardy argument in this case would
die with it.
However, this Court's precedent reveals that the pleading test did not die with the
repeal of I.C. § 18-301. The pleading test is the mechanism by which violations of the
Idaho Constitution's protection against double jeopardy are evaluated, and this Court
held over a century ago that I.C. § 18-301 was divorced from the constitutional analysis.
Therefore, this Court's concerns about the continuing viability of the pleading test
should be alleviated, and it should still reach the merits of Mr. Sepulveda's double
jeopardy argument as a result.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Sepulveda's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Supplemental
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

Mr. Sepulveda advanced other arguments in regard to errors in Docket Number 42758
in his initial briefing. However, there is no need for supplemental briefing on those two
issues. As such, this Supplemental Brief will focus only on the double jeopardy,issue.
1

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Violated Mr. Sepulveda's Constitutional Right To Be Free From
Double Jeopardy Under The Idaho Constitution By Entering Convictions And Imposing
Sentences For Each Charge In The 2014 Case When One Of Those Charges Was
Alleged As The Means By Which Each Of The Other Two Charges Was Committed

A.

Idaho's Pleading Test Survives Despite The Repeal Of I.C. § 18-301

1.

The Pleading Test Is Used To Determine Whether There Has Been A
Violation Of The Idaho Constitution's Protection Against Double Jeopardy,
And I.C. § 18-301 Was Expressly Divorced From The Constitutional
Analysis

The Idaho Constitution provides: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense." IDAHO CONST., Art. I, § 13. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held
that the test for determining whether there has been a violation of that provision is the
pleading theory. State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 (Ct. App. 2014), rev. denied. The
Court of Appeals based that conclusion on the analysis this Court undertook in several
of its opinions on this issue. See id.
In State v. McKinney, for example, this Court repeatedly noted that there were
two distinct claims at issue:

(1) a violation of the federal and state constitutions'

protection against double jeopardy, and (2) a violation of Idaho's multiple punishment
statute, I.C. § 18-301. 2 See, e.g., McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 839 (2013) ("McKinney
alleges that his sentence violates the double jeopardy clauses of the Idaho and federal
constitutions, as well as Idaho's multiple-punishment statute, I.C. § 18-301 (repealed

Although I.C. § 18-301 had been repealed by the time the defendant in McKinney
raised that claim, he could validly make a separate argument under that code section
because it was the law that was in effect at the time he was convicted; he was
challenging his 1981 conviction following a successful habeas corpus action in federal
court. See McKinney, 153 Idaho at 840 n.5.
2

3

a

1

or

those sentences contravene double jeopardy principles?
B. Was McKinney properly sentenced for the substantive crimes of murder
and robbery in addition to the conspiracies to commit those crimes, or
did those sentences contravene Idaho's multiple-punishment statute,
I.C. § 18-301?
McKinney, 153 Idaho at 840.

While McKinney discussed the two constitutional arguments at the same time,
the opinion also made it clear that Idaho's pleading test was distinctly different from the
federal elements test: "At one extreme, the federal courts apply the 'strict elements'
approach and look only to the statutory elements of the crimes charged. At the other
extreme, courts following the 'cognate-evidence' approach examine the evidence
actually adduced at trial.
"

The 'pleading theory,' which Idaho has adopted, is an
153 Idaho at 841.

The Court considered, and

ultimately rejected, both of Mr. McKinney's double jeopardy claims before turning, in a
separate section of the opinion, to his claim under I.C. § 18-301. See McKinney, 153
Idaho at 841. And, of critical note, this Court discussed the pleading theory only in the
double jeopardy portion of

opinion, not the portion dealing with I.C. § 18-301. See

generally McKinney, 153 Idaho at 840-42. Therefore, the entirety of this Court's opinion

in McKinney, from its structuring of the opinion to its discussion of the issues, indicates
that the pleading theory is the test for evaluating the double jeopardy protections of the
Idaho Constitution.

4

in a

in

V.

1
were

on

jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment of
Idaho Constitution.

Id. at

United States Constitution and the

The Court concluded that, under the federal elements

test, the two offenses were not included offenses.

Id.

However, applying Idaho's

pleading theory, the Thompson Court concluded that the two charges were included
offenses. Id. at 435 ("[T]he attempt to rob was carried out by shooting at the door of the
victim, which was the same fact alleged in the charge of assault with a deadly weapon.
It was alleged as the manner or means by which the robbery was attempted."). As a
result, it affirmed the decision to dismiss one of those charges. Id. After discussing the
constitutional protections and the pleading theory, the Court turned to look at the
protections available under I.C. § 18-301. Thompson, 101 Idaho at 436 ("In addition,
§ 18-301 prevents multiple prosecutions for various crimes which arise from the

same act. There was only one act, shooting at the door of the victim. The defendant
cannot be prosecuted for more than one crime arising from that act under I.C. § 18301."). Thus, the Thompson Opinion indicates that the pleading theory discussion must
have been assessing whether there was a violation of the Idaho Constitution's
independent protections against double jeopardy.
In fact, Thompson reinforced this conclusion by contrasting that decision with the
decision in State v. Horn, 101 Idaho 192 (1980).
also did

In Hom, "[t]he defendant-appellant

present the broader test [the pleading theory] to the court although he did

argue that I.C. § 18-301 precluded his being punished twice for the same act or

5

n.

1

an

error:
of the information in

cases reveals that in

were the two

convictions for the same offense such as to offend the prohibition against double
jeopardy." Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435 n.5. By describing the pleading theory analysis
as a fully separate and articulable claim directly addressing the prohibition against
double jeopardy despite the claim under Section 18-301, Thompson further reveals that
the pleading theory is the test for assessing whether a violation of Art. I, § 13 has
occurred.
This Court long recognized that I.C. § 18-301 was divorced from the Idaho
Constitution's protection against double jeopardy: "It should also

remembered, upon

the very threshold of our investigation of this case, that our statute differs materially and
essentially from the provision of sec. 13, art. 1, of

state constitution. . . ."3

State v. Gutke, 25 Idaho 737, 740 (1914); cf. State v. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho 452, 45455 (1996).

This Court explained the distinction between the statute and the

constitutional provision was based on the plain language of the two provisions: 'The
constitutional provision deals with the subject of putting a defendant twice in jeopardy
for the same offense. On the other hand, the statute (section 7230) above quoted is not

dealing with the 'same offense,' but the same 'act or omission."' Id. (emphasis from
original).

'vVhen Gutke was evaiuating this issue, the reievant statute was codified as Idaho
Rev. Stat. § 7230. See, e.g., Idaho
Stat § 7230 (1887). That
was
subsequently recodified as I.C. § 18-301.
3

6

Accordingly this

be remembered,

held:

in jeopardy'

same

respect applicable to the statute here under consideration."4

are

the very

no essential

Id. (emphasis added).

Thus, for over a century, Section 18-301 was distinctly different than the Idaho
Constitution's protections against double jeopardy, standing simply as an additional,
independent protection against duplicitous sentences. See, e.g., State v. Killinger, 126
Idaho 737, 739 ( 1995) (describing Section 18-301 as a "statutory prohibition against
multiple punishments for the same act"); State v. Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097, 1099 (1987)
(describing Section 18-301 as "provid[ing] broader protection against double jeopardy
than the State or Federal Constitution"') (emphasis added). 5
Since the pleading theory articulates the constitutional analysis, and since
I.C. § 18-301 never informed the constitutional analysis, the fact that I.C. § 18-301 has
been repealed has no impact on the continued viability of the pleading theory or the
scope of Mr. Sepulveda's claim of a violation of the Idaho Constitution's double jeopardy
provisions.

Gutke's description of the constitutional protection as referring to being put "twice in
jeopardy" reinforces the conclusion that Thompson was applying the pleading test to the
Idaho Constitution, as it also described the protection being discussed as the protection
against double jeopardy. Compare Gutke, 25 Idaho at 740, with Thompson, 101 Idaho
4

435 n.5.

As will be discussed in Section B, infra, the Idaho Constitution itself provides more
protection than the United States Constitution. As such, I.C. § 18-301 provided a third
level of protection, broader than either "the State or Federal Constitution" until its repeal.

5

7

on

to "the same offense.
provides no insight

IDAHO CONST.,

I, § 17. While Section 18-301

how that term is to be understood, I

§ 19-2312, which

specifically refers to "offenses," does. 6 See Gulke, 25 Idaho at 740 (explaining that the
term "offense" is the critical language in Art. I,§ 13). The language in Section 19-2312
has existed under different codifications since territorial days. Compare I. C. § 19-2312,

with Idaho Rev. Stat. § 7926 (1887), and Idaho Crim. Prac. Act§ 411 (1863-1864); see
also State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, _ , 64 P. 1014, 1018-19 (1901) (quoting Section
7926, revealing that it was identical to I

§ 19-2312). As a result, Section 19-2312

represents how the founders of the Idaho Constitution would have understood what
constitutes the "same offense" when they drafted Art. I, § 1
740; cf. State v.

nru,,rc-r,n

See Gutke, 25 Idaho at

82 Idaho 293, 303 ( 1960) ("We therefore hold,

our desire

to clear the confusion which has arisen in the premises, that pursuant to I.C. § 19-2312,
any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that charged in the
indictment or information, is an included offense .... ")
Accordingly, it was to Section 19-2312, not Section 18-301, that this Court turned
when explaining how the pleading theory operated: "Many jurisdictions have expanded
the definition of lesser included offenses beyond the statutory theory and utilize what is
called the 'indictment' or 'pleading' theory. Idaho has adopted this pleading approach

Section 19-2312 provides: "The jury may find the defendant guilty of any offense, the
comm1ss1on
which is necessarily included in that with which he is
in
indictment, or of an attempt to commit the offense." I.C. § 19-2312 (2016).

6

8

case law." Id. at 433-34 (internal citations and footnote omitted).

by statute and

101

433-34
as

980).

case

statute
test were

source

§ 19-2312 and

Anderson. Thompson, 101 Idaho at 434. Thus, the fact that the understanding of the
constitutional standard and the pleading test is reflected in I.C. § 19-2312, not I.C. § 18301, further reveals that the pleading theory has survived the repeal of I.C. § 18-301.
This conclusion is borne out by the fact that this Court continues to rely on the
pleading test years after Section 18-301 was repealed.

See, e.g., State v. Sanchez-

Castro, 157 Idaho 647 (2014); State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525 (2011). In both Flegel and
Sanchez-Castro, this Court reaffirmed the propriety of using the pleading test without
citing I.C. § 18-301 at all. See generally id. 7 Rather, Sanchez-Castro cited Flegel as
the source of the pleading test.

Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 648.

rooted its discussion of the pleading theory in Anderson.

Flegel, in turn,

Flegel, 151 Idaho at 529

(quoting Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197,211 (1986) (quoting Anderson, 82 Idaho at
301 )).

Therefore, this Court's concerns about the continuing viability of the pleading

Flegel was evaluating whether the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
included offense. See generally Flegel, 151 Idaho 526 (discussing IDAHO CONST., Art. I,
§ 8). However, that does not mean Flegel is inapplicable to the double jeopardy
analysis under Art. I, § 13:
7

The test for determining whether one offense is a lesser included of
another is the same regardless of whether the determination is being
made to decide if a requested instruction is proper or whether the
determination is being made for the purposes of deciding if a defendant
can be convicted of both offenses or only one under the double jeopardy
clause.
Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; cf Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 648 (relying on Flegefs
discussion of the pleading theory in the double jeopardy context).

9

in light

of I

.§ 1

it should

should be

Than The United States Constitution
There is one final presumption which underpins this whole issue, and so, also
needs to be addressed:

that the Idaho Constitution does, in fact, provide greater

protections against double jeopardy than the United States Constitution. To that point,
Mr. Sepulveda recognizes this Court stated in Reichenberg that the Idaho double
jeopardy provision does not be provide greater protection than the United States
Constitution. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho at 457-59. However, it is important to note the
framework in which the Court set its analysis of that question:

"such independent

analysis of our state constitution does not necessarily mean that this Court will reach a
result different from the United States Supreme Court under [the relevant section of the
Idaho Constitution]." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Thus, Reichenberg continued to
affirm that Idaho's constitutional protections were not co-extensive with the federal
provisions as it still called for an independent analysis under the Idaho Constitution. Id.
What Reichenberg explained was that the difference between the state and federal
protections does not necessarily mean the ultimate answer to whether there was a
constitutional violation will be different under the state constitution. Id.
Accordingly, this Court concluded that Idaho's constitution did not provide
broader protections in Reichenberg for three reasons:

(1) the language of the two

provisions was not so different as to compel a different answer under the state
constitution, (2) the existence of LC. § 18-301 did not compel a different answer under

10

§ 1
a

jeopardy. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho at 458-59; see a/so Berglund v. Potlatch Corp., 129
752, 757 (1996) (making the same statement, that Idaho's protections are coextensive with the federal protections, in regard to a reimbursement order for reasons
similar to the third rationale of Reichenberg). None of those rationales are applicable to
the facts of Mr. Sepulveda's case.

To the third Reichenberg rationale, improperly

duplicitous convictions definitely constitute punishment under Idaho's understanding of
jeopardy.

See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 127 Idaho 24, 28-30 (Ct App. 1995) (finding a

double jeopardy violation in the dual convictions for included offenses pursuant to the
pleading test rationale). To the second Reichenberg rationale, Section 18-301 does not
apply to the constitutional analysis, and so, has no bearing on whether the Idaho
provides more protection
Finally, to the

(See Section A, supra.)

this

Reichenberg rationale, it is not the language of the state

constitutional provision which dictates whether that provision provides more protection
than the United States Constitution.

Rather, it is "the uniqueness of our state, our

Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence" which will justify providing more
protections under the Idaho Constitution.
(2001 ).

See State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 4 72

Furthermore, this Court has recognized that, even under the same

constitutional provision, there may be some circumstances where the Idaho Constitution
will provide more protection and others where it will not.

See id. (explaining that, in

some circumstances, though not all, Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution provided

11

mean
Idaho's double jeopardy provision

not

additional protections in all

circumstances.
In fact, this Court's own precedent reveals that there are circumstances where
Idaho's double jeopardy protections will provide broader protections than the United
States Constitution.

See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 433-35.

examined the double jeopardy protections under both
constitutions.

Thompson, 101 Idaho at 433.

In Thompson, this Court
the

state and federal

This Court expressly found dual

convictions would not violate the United States Constitution because the charges did
not amount to included offenses under the federal elements test. Thompson, 101 Idaho
at

However, applying Idaho's pleading

this Court held dual convictions
of the

a double

offending charge. Thompson, 101 Idaho 434-35. Therefore, under the circumstances
in Thompson, the Idaho Constitution affirmatively provided more double jeopardy
protections than the United States Constitution.
The facts and precedent discussed in Section A, supra, show that "the
uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence" justify
more protections under the Idaho Constitution in cases such as Mr. Sepulveda's. See

Donato, 135 Idaho at 472. Idaho has, since its territorial days, had the understanding
that whether two offenses are "included offenses," whether they are the "same offense,"
is based on the way the offense is charged. See Idaho Cr. Prac. § 411 (1863-1864);

12

§ 7926

1

887); Alcorn, 64

8-19.

authors

(discussing the terminology in Art. I, § 13). Idaho's courts have consistently relied on
that understanding since at least 1901.

Compare Alcorn, 64 P. at 1018-19, with

Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433-34, and Flegel, 151 Idaho at 529.

It has also

recognized the distinction between Idaho's test and the federal test since at least 1980.
See Thompson, 101 Idaho 433-34 (basing its decision on the 1960 opinion in Anderson,
82 Idaho at 301 ); cf. McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841.
There is nothing showing that those cases are manifestly wrong, unjust, or
unwise, nor is there anything showing overruling those decisions is necessary to
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice, and so, the
rule of stare decisis means that this Court should hold to those decisions. Houghland
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72,

(1990). Therefore, "based on the uniqueness

of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence," the Idaho
Constitution should be read to provide more protections against double jeopardy than
the United States Constitution in cases such as Mr. Sepulveda's.

13

§

was
the

pleading theory is the test

evaluating whether that constitutional protection has been

violated, Mr. Sepulveda's double jeopardy claim under the Idaho Constitution via the
pleading theory in Docket No. 42759 remains live despite the fact that I.C. § 18-301 has
been repealed. As such, this Court should address the merits of that claim by applying
the Idaho pleading theory in accordance with its precedent on the matter.
DATED this 15th day of June, 2016.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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